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Williams: Interruption of Use: A Prescription for Prescription

COMMENTARY
INTERRUPTION

OF USE: A PRESCRIPTION FOR PRESCRIPTION

The little-understood, common law doctrine of prescription may deprive
landowners of the right to alter the use of their property. After twenty
years of public use a landowner may find he cannot block pathways across
5
his land,1 close a private road,2 or prevent access to his beach-front property.
4
He may not stop neighbors from parking cars on his land or the public
from hunting5 or making other use of his property.6 Commercial landowners
might suffer even greater consequences. Private roads used by the public,
which pass through apartment complexes, shopping centers, and other busi7
ness areas, may become irrevocably vested in the public.
The effect of a prescriptive easement is settled in the law. If the landowner tries to close off his former land, he is subject to civil and criminal
penalties. 8 If the landowner conveys land subject to a prescriptive easement,
he might, depending on the nature of the easement," breach the covenant
against encumbrances contained in a general warranty deed. Although a
reservation in the deed would eliminate this problem the grantor, at the
time of the conveyance, is often unaware of the prescriptive easement, since
it is usually asserted only when an alteration of the use is attempted. If the
1. E.g., Dyer v. Thurston, 32 Mich. App. 341, 188 N.W.2d 633 (1971).
2. E.g., Johnson v. Faulk, 470 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App. 1971).
3. E.g., Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377 (1971).
4. E.g., Ashley v. Waite, 33 Mich. App. 420, 190 N.W.2d 370 (1971).
5. E.g., Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Vulles, 437
F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1971).
6. The public has acquired other rights through prescription, such as the right to
appropriate water in excess of the natural right, to dam, pollute, or change a stream, to
take seaweed or fish from another's land, or to attach a sign to another's building. However,
rights cannot be acquired by prescription when the owner of the land is incapable of
preventing their use, as in the case of percolating water or easements for air and light
(ancient lights). 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §1194 (3d ed. 1939). Prescription
also has application in national and international situations. The boundary between
Virginia and Tennessee was altered by prescription, Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,
522 (1893), and several European boundaries, in order to preserve peace, have been estab-

lished with reference to it. W.

HALL,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW 143-44 (8th ed. 1924). This

type of prescription should be distinguished from extinctive prescription. See, e.g., Italy
(Gentini) v. Venezuela, Mixed Claims Commission, 1903, Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations
of 1903, 720, 724-30 (1904).
7. See Comment, The Law and Private Streets, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 588, 589 (1959).
8. For example, Florida Statutes, §339.31 (1971) provides: "Whoever obstructs any
public road or established highway by fencing across or into the same, or by willfully
causing any other obstruction in or to such road or highway, or any part thereof, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . . . and the judgment of the court
shall also be that the obstruction is removed."
9. A covenant against encumbrances is broken on delivery of the deed, if an encumbrance on the land then exists. The vendee's knowledge of an encumbrance, such as a
highway or some other visible easement, does not take such encumbrance out of the
operation of the covenant. 7 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §3186 (repl. 1962). But see
1 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §15.08 (1971).
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purchaser suffers loss, his attorney may be subject to a negligence suit for
failing to discover the prescriptive easement just as when he fails to discover
adverse possessors.1 0
The property owner's economic loss may be substantial. In contrast to
eminent domain, no compensation is provided for loss resulting from prescription. The reduction of the parcel's value is likely to be greater than the
value of the prescriptive easement itself. Construction may be limited to
smaller parcels of land and the resale value of two smaller pieces of property
will often be less than the value of the original tract. Furthermore, the
borders of the easement may have to comply with greenbelt and setback
requirements."
The wise landowner may escape these consequences by avoiding the
creation of a prescriptive easement. Although the common law provided
several ways to accomplish this end,32 the most effective is to interrupt the
use of the land by the public.' 3 Unfortunately, neither the Florida courts nor
the legislature' 4 have adequately defined what constitutes a sufficient interruption of the use and the decisions of other jurisdictions are in conflict.
This commentary will examine the acquisition of prescriptive rights and
their prevention by interruption of the use. Adequate knowledge of the area
is essential to an attorney when development of property is planned, when
a prescriptive right is asserted, and when land is conveyed.
ACQUISITION OF A PRESCIPTIVE RIGHT

A page of history is worth a volume of logic' 5 in an analysis of the law
of prescription. At common law a prescriptive right to an easement originally
required enjoyment from time immemorial", and was based upon a presumption that at some time there had been a grant by deed." In an effort
to restrict within reasonable bounds the length of enjoyment that had to
be proved, the courts adopted various statutory dates as the time at which
legal memory was to begin.' The Statute of Westminster of 1275 used the
year 1189 in connection with the bringing of Writs of Right of Recovery of
Land. This statute was unrelated to prescription, but courts often selected
1189 as the date from which to measure legal memory.' 9
10. Cf. 1 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRAciCE §9.28, at 357 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal
Educ. Practice Manual (2d ed. 1971)).
11. A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 34-11 n.28 (3d ed. 1969).
12. See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
18. See 1 R. BOYER, supra note 9, §23.03 (4) (c) (iv).
14. Cf. notes 24, 38, 48, 76 infra and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Cozy Home Realty Co. v. Ralston, 214 Ind. 149, 152, 14 N.E.2d 917,
918-19 (1938).
16. "[D]uring the time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary."
Co. Litt. 114B; Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brownl. 192 (1612). Thus, during the reign of Elizabeth
I enjoyment of land for thirty or forty years was insufficient to establish a prescriptive
title. 7 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 345 (2d ed. 1937).
17. 7 W. HoLDswORTH note 16 supra.
18. G. CHEsHIRE, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 484 (10th ed. 1967).
19. As a result, the first year of the reign of Richard I, 1189, replaced enjoyment from
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The problems with a fixed date were obvious. 2 0 If it were shown that
the use must have begun after 1189, a prescriptive claim at common law
failed. To prevent injustice when enjoyment for a reasonable time was
shown, judges in the eighteenth century began presuming that an actual
grant had been made and later lost.2 1 In 1786 Lord Mansfield declared that

twenty years' use amounted to "such decisive presumption of a right by
grant or otherwise that, unless contradicted or explained, the jury ought to
believe it."22
England codified much of the common law of prescription in the Prescription Act of 1832.23 However, legislation similar to this Act has generally
not been adopted in American jurisdictions. 2 4 As a result, American courts
employed the uncertain body of rules developed by the English courts.2 5 The
common law theory that prescriptive rights were based on a presumption of
a prior grant has now been abandoned in some jurisdictions, including
Florida, and the acquisition of these rights is treated as being similar to
that of adverse possession.

2

Title by adverse possession is established through exclusive possession,
while a prescriptive right arises through use of the privilege without actual
possession.2 7 The nature of the right is the principal difference between

time immemorial as the measuring rod. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 16, at 343.
20. See G. CHESHIRE note 18 supra.
21. G. CHESHIRE, supra note 18, at 497. Thus, proof of twenty years use, unexplained,
was presumptive evidence from which a jury could infer the truth of a plea. 7 IV. HOtsWORTH, supra note 16, at 348. An explanation for this change is that evidence of a valid
beginning becomes increasingly difficult to procure with the passage of time. 2 AMs. L. oF
PROPERTY §8.44 (1952).
22. Nevertheless, this twenty-year period did not conclusively establish the right. 7 W.
HoLnswoRTH, supra note 16, at 348.
23. See 2, 3 Will. 4, c. 71. Section 2 of the act changes the test from legal memory
or the date 1189 to use without interruption for twenty years. All common law defenses
were still available, but an easement enjoyed for forty years was absolute and indefensible
unless written consent to the use had been given.
24. 2 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 21, §8.51. But see N.D. CENT. CODE §24-07-01
(1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §14-812 (1965). Many state courts have borrowed the time
limitation of adverse possession. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §460, comment a (1944). Cf. J.C.
Vereen & Sons v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 648, 167 So. 45, 48 (1936). Also, some states have
varied the common law rule by statute. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §1008 (West Supp.
1971) (signs); MINN. STAT. ANN. §160.06 (1960) (15 years for trail or portage); PA. STAT.
ANN. §68-411 (1965) (none through unenclosed woodland); R.I. GE . LAws ANN. §34-7-5
(1969 reenactment) (utility rights-of-way acquired by enjoyment).
25. An example of these rules is: "A litigant who relied on prescription at common
law might succeed if he could show thirty or fort), years use. On the other hand, a
litigant who could show eighty or a hundred years use might fail, if, e.g., unity of seisin
were proved to have existed some two centuries ago." 7 W. HorLnswoRTa, supra note 16, at
349. Other common law doctrines, such as immemorial use and the arbitrary date, 1189,
were obviously inappropriate for American jurisdictions. See Coolidge v. Learned, 25
Mass. (8 Pick.) 503, 507 (1829).
26. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla. 1958); 3 J. ADKINS, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
LAw §82.04 (1960).
27. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 65 (Fla. 1958).
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title acquired by adverse possession and a prescriptive right. The latter is an
incorporeal hereditament in land based on the presumption of a prior grant,
while the former is a corporeal right based on the abandonment of the land

28
to the adverse possessor.
Open, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the owner is required for prescription in Florida. 29 Use is
"open" if a person makes repeated crossings whenever convenient; 0 it is
"adverse" simply if it is not permissive.31 It has been suggested that permissive use is similar to a revocable license such as permission to hunt, fish, or
drive on land when the owner has the right to withdraw the permission at
any time. 2 "Acquiescence" means that the owner has not effectively interrupted88 or disputed the right of the other party to cross the property.
The leading Florida prescription case is Downing v. Bird.-4 The city had
constructed an asphalt road on the owner's land without her consent and
she sought its removal and damages. The city argued that the public had
used the land without interruption for more than twenty years before the
suit. While the owner had paid the taxes on the land for many years8 5 the
court held that the assessment and collection of taxes was not conclusive in
forming the basis for an estoppel against the city, but was only one item to
be considered with the other evidence86 The court upheld the city's contention even though it recognized that acquisition of rights by use alone should

be restricted.8 1 The result in Downing makes it necessary in a prescription
case to allege and prove that the public had the continued and uninter-

rupted use of the plaintiffs land for a period of at least twenty years prior
28. Id.
29. Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697, 700 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Boyer distinguishes these characteristics from adverse possession because the claimant is
"not occupying or possessing the land but simply making a limited use thereof." 1 R.
Boym, supra note 9, §23.03 (c) (i).
30.

Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 489-90, 137 P. 260, 262 (1918). See also 1 R. Boym,

supranote 9, §23.08 (c) (ii).
31. 1 R. Boyn, supra note 9, §23.03 (c)(iii). The necessity of an adverse use in order
to establish a highway by prescription in Florida was emphasized in Couture v. Dade
County, 93 Fla. 342, 352, 112 So. 75, 79 (1927), in which the county sought to enjoin the
defendants from obstructing a road alleged to be a public highway. Although the evidence
was insufficient to support the contention that the right-of-way was acquired by purchase,
condemnation, gift, or prescription, the court said "it is the adverse use and possession
which establishes the highway." While this "mere use of a roadway does not alone
establish its character as a public highway," it was nevertheless dearly noted that a
public highway may be created by grant and acceptance or by prescription and usage. See
also Daugherty v. Latham, 139 Fla. 477, 489, 190 So. 742, 747 (1939).
32. 1 R. BoYFR, supra note 9, §23.03 (c) (iii).
33. Id. §23.03 (c) (vi).
34. 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958).
35. Id. at 60.
36. Id. at 61; cf. Levering v. Tarpon Springs, 92 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1957); Trustees of
Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 782 (Fla. 1956); Verh v. Morris,
410 Ill. 206, 207, 101 N.E.2d 566, 568 (1951); Lockey v. Bozeman, 42 Mont. 381, 394, 113 P.
286, 288 (1910).
37. 100 So. 2d 57, at 65, citing Irion v, Nelson, 207 Okla, 243, 249 P.2d 107 (1952).
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to the barricading; that the identity of the use - its route, terminus, and
width- remained constant during the period; and that the use was adverse
or under claim of right.
METHODS OF INTERRUPTING THE USE

In all jurisdictions interruption of use is the prime and most effective
method of preventing acquisition of a prescriptive right.3 8 Once the use is
interrupted the accumulated prescriptive period is nullified and must begin
again. If the use is not interrupted the prescriptive period is fulfilled and
the right to the easement vests in the public.3 9
Attempts to interrupt public use generally employ one of these methods:
(1) erecting a fence or some other obstruction on the land, (2) posting signs
or notices that the land is private, or (3) prosecuting a lawsuit through
judgment. Each of these methods has met with varying degrees of success.
In ruling upon the legal efficacy of these various techniques of interruption,
many courts have looked to the intent of the landowner. In these cases the
owner must have intended the fence or other obstruction to interfere with
public travel. Thus, erection of a fence has been held to be an insufficient
interruption when it is solely for the convenience of the owner 40 as when
it is used to enclose livestock. 4" This reasoning has been criticized because
a person who obstructs the way for his own convenience, even though without intent to interrupt, is showing that he asserts dominion and control
42
over the property.
Other courts have looked to the effect of the method chosen on the public
use in order to determine the sufficiency of the technique. For example, if

38.
§47-38

1 R. BoYER, supra note 9, §23.03(c)(iv). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
(1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §14-812 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. §160.06 (1960);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §34-7-6 (1969 Reenactment).
39.

See Couture v. Dade County, 93 Fla. 342, 352, 112 So. 75, 79 (1925). In

Nelms v.

Steelhammer, 225 Ark. 429, 433, 283 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1955), the public had at one time
acquired a right by prescription, but acquiescence in the use of gates for eight to ten years
destroyed any previously acquired prescriptive rights.
40. The interruption must be of the right to use the road and not of just the use.
Hansen v. Green, 275 Ill. 221, 227, 113 N.E. 982, 984 (1916); Pitser v. McCreery, 172 Ind.
663, 673, 88 N.E. 303, 307 (1909). Contra, Jones v. Davis, 35 Wis. 376, 382 (1874).
41.

Pitser v. McCreery, 172 Ind. 663, 668, 88 N.E. 303, 305

(1909). "[Sjurely

nothing

can be more inconsistent with the purpose and object of a public highway than the right
of any individual to fence it up or put bars across it. A highway, from its very nature,
must be open and free for the passage of all persons, both by day and night, who may
have occasion to travel over it. No one has a right to enclose it with gates and bars for
the purpose of herding cattle at night; and where the owner of the soil does fence up a
way, he evinces in the most unambiguous manner an intention to exclude the public
from it." Jones v. Davis, 35 Wis. 376, 382 (1874).
42. See, e.g., Stacey v. Miller, 14 Mo. 478, 479 (1851). If he were not properly asserting
this control, the landowner might be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. This assertion
of control can be distinguished from a similar obstruction of public roads, since a person
cannot be arrested for obstruction of his own private property prior to the running of
the prescriptive period. Bree v. Wheeler, 129 Cal. 145, 147, 61 P. 782, 783 (1900).
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chains or wires across a road are taken down and not replaced- 3 or if the
obstructions, though not moved, do not impede the public, the use continues. 44
However, obstructions blocking passage completely and for extensive periods
4
of time4 5 do toll the use,4 6 even if persons and animals can squeeze through. 7
In general, signs designating land as private do not interrupt the use,48
despite the owner's apparent intent to the contrary, when they do not
hamper use of the property.4 9 Public knowledge that the land is claimed
to be private may therefore be irrelevant if people continue their use. But
signs have been adequate when coupled with other means that actually did
interrupt the use. Thus, fences with gates open to the public and notices advising that the land was private have on occasion sufficiently interrupted
the use.50
Some courts have approached the sufficiency of the different techniques
on the basis of notice. In these jurisdictions the mere placement of any
obstacle across a way is sufficient notice that the public lacks the right to
use the way even if it can pass. 5 ' As a result, a gate placed in a fence that
52
crosses a highway indicates that passage is permissive and not of right.
Indeed, even sporadic erection of gates has been sufficient to interrupt use,
since maintenance of gates "along a line of travel is not inconsistent with
a private easement, but their presence is inconsistent with the existence of a
public highway."53 A few courts have not agreed that a fence with a gate is
a sufficient interruption. These decisions note that the gates do not obstruct
travelers,5 4 especially when not intended for that purpose. 5 As a result,
when gates neither extend across the route nor block public use there is
no interruption of use.56

43. Spindler v. Toomey, 232 Ind. 328, 331-32, 111 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1953).
44. Thorworth v. Scheets, 269 Il. 573, 583-84, 110 N.E. 42, 46 (1915).
45. Since continuous use by the public must exist without interruption for the full
20-year period in order to make prescription apply, evidence showing that a road was
cultivated and used to grow crops has been sufficient to prevent acquisition of title by the
public to the land through prescription. See Blevins v. McCarty, 266 Ala. 297, 302, 96 So.
2d 437, 441 (1957).
46. Rolling v. Emrich, 122 Wis. 134, 136-37, 99 N.E. 464, 465 (1904).
47. Dalton v. Real Estate & Improvement Co., 201 Md. 34, 41, 92 A.2d 575, 589 (1952).
48. See, e.g., Spindler v. Toomey, 232 Ind. 328, 111 N.E.2d 715 (1953). But see CAL.
Crv. CODE ANN. §1008 (West Supp. 1971): "No use by any person or persons, no matter
how long continued, of any land, shall ever ripen into an easement by prescription, if the
owner of such property posts at each entrance to the property or at intervals of not more
than 200 feet along the boundary a sign reading substantially as follows: 'Right to pass by
permission, and subject to control, of owner: Section 1008, Civil Code.'"
49. Cozy Home Realty Co. v. Ralston, 214 Ind. 149, 152, 14 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (1938).
50. Seattle v. Moeller, 72 Wash. 99, 102-03, 129 P. 884, 885 (1913).
51. Porter v. Huff, 162 Ark. 52, 54, 257 S.W. 393 (1924).
52. Id.
53. Bino v. Hurley, 14 Wis. 2d 101, 112, 109 N.W.2d 544, 549 (1961).
54. Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, 252, 3 P. 871, 872 (1884).
55. Pitser v. McCreery, 172 Ind. 663, 668, 88 N.E. 303, 305 (1909).
56. Huggins v. Turner, 258 Ala. 7, 9, 60 So. 2d 909, 910 (1952). Also, sliding gates kept
open except for the twenty-five days of a racing season do not interrupt the use. Southern
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Pursuit of a lawsuit to judgment has been sufficient to interrupt the
use, 57 presumably because the owner has acted seasonably to preserve his
8
rights and thus informed the public that their passage is not tolerated.
The extent of public reliance may be an unexpressed factor in judicial
treatment of the varying techniques of interruption and may be a means to
reconcile otherwise conflicting decisions. Accordingly, if the public has expended a substantial amount of money to improve the easement the court
may be reluctant to grant relief to the landowner. For example, in Downing
v. Bird59 the court refused to order the removal of an asphalt road even
though it had been constructed without the owner's consent. Furthermore,
if the public foregoes opportunities to develop other routes of travel it often
would be injured if an owner after many years were allowed to reassert
dominion over the property. 6 Public reliance is encouraged if the owner
fails to assert his rights or give the public notice sufficiently advising it that
it is not traveling on the way as a matter of right. As a matter of policy
the public right after constant use for a long time will be recognized as
61
paramount to the private right.
Public maintenance of a private road has also influenced courts in their
determination of the sufficiency of various techniques. If a road is maintained as public by township authorities there is strong evidence that it is
a public highway. 62 Evidence of assumption of control and jurisdiction for

Maryland Agricultural Ass'n v. Meyer, 196 Md. 31, 35, 75 A.2d 89, 91 (1950); cf. Hoover v.
Smith, 451 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ark. 1970).
57. Rothman v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 155 App. Div. 192, 139 N.Y.S. 1041 (1st
Dep't 1913); Workman v. Curran, 89 Pa. 226 (1879). See also 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
413 (1968).
58. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rzv. 457, 476-77 (1897).
59. 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958).
60. Cf. I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs §140 (3d ed. 1957).
61. It was suggested by Justice Holmes that prescription, in its most profound sense,
comports with "the nature of man's mind," since people regard property as their own
after long use. Less fundamental justifications given by Holmes for a twenty-year period
are the unavailability of evidence after a long time, the desirability of peace, and the
policy of nonenforcement of abandoned rights. In this respect, prescription is similar to
statutes of limitation. Holmes, supra note 58, at 476-77. Another factor may be a court's
desire to ensure the maximum use of the land. Prescription limits the free alienation of
property and allows greater use of land. Since prescription assures at least a minimal use
of property by the public, modern natural law theories of land ownership based on
economics rather than ethics, R. POUND, INTRODuCrION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 114-215
(rev. ed. 1954), support its application, especially since free alienation is no longer asserted
to be in the interest of economic progress. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW
589 (1950). Cf. I R. POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 430-32 (1959). Prescription also accords with the
assertion of socialists that labor (use) is the only moral title to economic reward. See H.
LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 189-211 (3d ed. 1938).
62. Phillips v. Leininger, 280 Ill.. 132, 139, 117 N.E. 497, 499-500 (1917). In Lake
County v. Gatch, 168 So. 2d 81 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964), the county had placed straw in ruts,
put some clay on the surface, and resurfaced and graded the road; these actions were
sufficient to establish dedication by prescription when coupled with twenty years use by
the public. The width of a prescriptive easement includes shoulders and ditches needed
and actually used because these are necessary for the support and maintenance of the
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the requisite time 3 over a road by the government has at times aided
acquisition of a prescriptive easement 64 while a lack of public maintenance
may help prevent prescription.65 The municipal repair of a road, combined
with other factors, has led one court to overlook obstructions and find that
a prescriptive right had vested.66 While just maintenance work alone by a
subdivision of a state is generally insufficient to make a road a public highway, 67 title to a way vests in the public by Florida statute when the road is
constructed and worked by the public authorities for four years.6 8
Many jurisdictions have reached different results not only in regard to
the sufficiency of the methods of interruption but also in regard to the required degree of interruption. Some states allow an interruption of only a
few hours, other states insist that it be "substantial."6' 9 Courts have usually
held that this interruption, when it results from the act of the landowner,
differs from a voluntary cessation of use by the public. The latter does not
prevent prescription. The interruption cannot be merely casual or recognize
a right of passage,70 but it may be almost negligible under the rationale of
some courts. For example, the dripping of water upon a sidewalk during
winter was found to interrupt the use of the sidewalk and prevent acquisition of rights to the sidewalk by prescription.-'

paved or traveled portion. Grenell v. Scott, 134 So. 2d 866, 869 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). See
also IND. ANN. STAT. §26-1807 (Burns 1949 Replacement); W. VA. CODE ANN. §17-1-3 (1966).
63. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §40-103 (1961) (5 years); Mo. ANN. STAT. §228.190 (Vernon

1953) (10 years).
64. Board of County Comm'rs v. Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 138, 104 P. 531, 532 (1909).
65. Rolling v. Emrich, 122 Wis. 134, 136, 99 N.W. 464, 465 (1904).
66. Thorworth v. Scheets, 269 Ill. 573, 580, 110 N.E. 42, 45 (1915).
67. Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 142, 365 P.2d 247, 250 (1961).
68. FIA. STAT. §337.31 (1) (1971) provides: "Whenever any road constructed by any of
the several counties or incorporated municipalities or by the department shall have been
maintained, kept in repair or worked continuously and uninterruptedly for a period of
four years by any county, municipality, or by the department, either separately or jointly,
such road shall be deemed to be dedicated to the public to the extent in width which
has been actually worked for the period aforesaid, whether the same has ever been
formally established as a public highway or not. Such dedication shall be conclusively
presumed to vest in the particular county in which the road is located, if it be a county
road, or in the particular municipality, if it be a municipal street or road, or in the
state, if it be a road in the state highway system or state park road system, all right,
title, easement and appurtenances therein and thereto, whether there be any record of

conveyance, dedication or appropriation to the public use or not."
69. Note, Interruption of the Adverse Enjoyment of Easements, 20 Htv.
L. Rxv. 317,
318 (1907). In Verh v. Morris the court stated: "[Mjere intermission is not interruption"
and the barricading of a road for a day or a few days had no effect on prescriptive rights.
410 II. 206, 212, 101 N.E.2d 566, 570 (1951). This decision clearly conflicts with most cases
because it requires the claimant to acquiesce in the interruption and thus to make the

subsequent use merely permissive.

70. Shellhouse v. State, 110 Ind. 509, 511-12, 11 N.E. 484, 486 (1887).
71. Woodsville Fire Dist. v. Stahl, 80 N.H. 502, 504, 119 A. 123, 124 (1922).
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CONCLUSION

Although Florida courts have not ruled upon the adequacy of the different
methods of preventing prescription, either an actual, sustained, physicaF2
interruption of use or a lawsuit pursued to judgment should be sufficient to
alert the public to the private nature of land. Erection of a sign saying that
land is private should not suffice in itself to interrupt the use, nor will any
other device that merely puts the public on notice. A barrier should be erected
and left in place long enough to stop public travel.73 Although the amount
of time varies from state to state, a twenty-four hour total cessation in urban
areas should suffice. 74 In rural areas a longer time might be reasonably required. In addition, the public authorities should be instructed that all
maintenance work will be performed by the landowner and public maintenance crews should be ordered to leave if seen performing work upon the land.5
Other states have simplified this task by legislation. For example, California has provided some relief for the landowner by allowing him to prevent
the acquisition of a prescriptive right by recording a notice that states the
public's use is by permission.76 Until the Florida legislature acts, however,
appropriate counselling must be given to ensure that property rights are
77
protected against unforseen loss.

LARRY L. TEPLY
RICHARD L. WILLIAMS

72. A verbal protest might be sufficient in some cases. See 1 R. BoYER, FLORImA REAL
EsTATE TRANSACTIONS §23.03 (1971); Note supra note 69.
73. A landowner endangered by prescription might be wise to select a certain period
each year to block his property, for example, the Fourth of July or Thanksgiving. In this
way the approach of the holiday would remind him to close his land to the public. To
advise the public of the purpose of the interruption, legal notices informing of the period
that the land will be blocked should be run in the newspapers of general circulation.
Proof of publication should be obtained at the time. Pictures of the barricades should
be taken and affidavits of the photographers should be obtained. Off-duty policemen or
security guards should be hired to enforce the barricade and advise the public that the
road is blocked because it is private. These same persons will be available as witnesses in
event of litigation. In their absence at court their affidavits would be useful.
74. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
75. Comment, The Law and Private Streets, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 588, 591-92 (1959).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. §813 (West Supp. 1971).
77. A fairer method for the landowner, especially when ignorant of the law of prescription, would be for the state to reimburse him for the land in a fashion similar to
eminent domain.
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